Abstract. Obfuscation is one of the most intriguing open problems in cryptography and only a few positive results are known. In TCC'07, Hohenberger et al. proposed an obfuscator for a re-encryption functionality, which takes a ciphertext for a message encrypted under Alice's public key and transforms it into a ciphertext for the same message under Bob's public key [24] . It is the first complicated cryptographic functionality that can be securely obfuscated, but obfuscators for such cryptographic functionalities are still elusive. In this paper, we consider obfuscation for encrypted signature (ES) functionalities, which generate a signature on a given message under Alice's secret signing key and encrypt the signature under Bob's public encryption key. We propose a special ES functionality, which is the sequential composition of Waters's signature scheme [33] and the linear encryption scheme proposed by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [5] , and construct a secure obfuscator for it. We follow the security argument by Hohenberger et al. to prove that our proposed obfuscator satisfies a virtual black-box property (VBP), which guarantees that the security of the signature scheme is preserved even when adversaries are given an obfuscated program. Our security argument is in the standard model.
Introduction
An obfuscator is a tool to convert a program into a new unintelligible program while preserving the functionality. Several formal definitions have been proposed so far [22, 3, 27, 34, 20, 23, 24, 21, 9, 12] . Informally, obfuscators should satisfy the following two requirements: (1) functionality: the obfuscated program has the same functionality as the original one and (2) virtual black-box property (VBP): whatever one can efficiently compute given the obfuscated program can be computed given black-box access to the functionality. The functionality requirement is the syntactic requirement while the VBP is the security requirement to capture the unintelligibility of obfuscated programs.
As discussed in [3] , obfuscators, if they exist, would have a wide variety of cryptographic applications including software protection, fully homomorphic encryption, removing random oracles, and transforming private-key encryption schemes into public-key encryption schemes. Unfortunately, the impossibility of generic obfuscation have been shown in [3, 20] even under very weak VBP definitions, which require that any predicate that can be efficiently computed from an obfuscated program can also be efficiently computed given black-box access to the functionality. Specifically, they showed the existence of (contrived) functionalities for which no obfuscator can satisfy the weak VBPs. However, the negative results do not rule out the possibility that there exists an obfuscator for a specific functionality. Indeed, some positive results are known for point functions [8, 11, 27, 34, 20, 16, 23, 9, 12] . In spite of these positive results, obfuscators for traditional cryptographic functionalities have remained elusive.
In TCC'07, Hohenberger et al. proposed an obfuscator for a re-encryption functionality [24] . It is the first complicated cryptographic functionality that can be securely obfuscated. A re-encryption functionality for Alice and Bob takes a ciphertext for a message encrypted under Alice's public key and transforms it into a ciphertext for the same message under Bob's public key. The naive program contains both Alice's secret key and Bob's public key, and it simply decrypts the input ciphertext and encrypts the plain message. Clearly, this program reveals Alice's secret key to any party executing the program. If Alice can securely obfuscate the program, the VBP ensures that any party learns no more from the obfuscated program than it does from black-box access to the functionality. In particular, the obfuscated program does not reveal Alice's secret key and cannot be used for eavesdropping. Hohenberger et al. constructed a special encryption scheme and a secure obfuscator for the re-encryption functionality. Their security argument is based on a new VBP definition suitable for cryptographic functionalities. It ensures that the security of cryptographic functionalities can be preserved even when adversaries are given obfuscated programs (See the discussion in [24] ). They showed that the security of their proposed encryption scheme is preserved even when adversaries are given an obfuscated re-encryption program.
From both the theoretical and practical perspectives, it is important to investigate the possibility of secure obfuscation for more cryptographic functionalities. In this paper, we consider obfuscation for encrypted signature (ES) functionalities. An ES functionality for Alice and Bob generates a signature on a given message under Alice's secret signing key and then encrypts the signature under Bob's public encryption key. As in re-encryption, the naive program contains Alice's secret key and Bob's public key, and reveals Alice's secret key. If Alice can securely obfuscate the program, the VBP ensures that any party executing the obfuscated program cannot forge Alice's signature. We propose a special pair of signature and encryption schemes and construct a secure obfuscator for the ES functionality. Also, we follow the security argument by Hohenberger et al. in [24] to show that the security of signature scheme is preserved even when adversaries are given an obfuscated ES program.
We believe that there are many useful applications of our proposed obfuscation. We informally describe an application to secure Webmail services. ES should not be confused with Signature-then-Encryption or Sign-then-Encrypt (StE). The StE functionality signs a given message and then encrypts both the message and signature. StE is the most widely-used approach to constructing a signcryption scheme [2, 35] 1 . On the other hand, the ES functionality does not encrypt the message itself and we can not necessarily use it as a signcryption scheme. However, as shown in Appendix A, we believe that one can use an ES functionality as a building block to construct a signcryption functionality and that an obfuscator for the ES functionality can be used to obfuscate the signcryption functionality. Potential target applications include Webmail services such as Yahoo! Mail and Google's Gmail where users use e-mail services via Web browsers. If users want to signcrypt their messages and their Web browsers do not have the required capability then their Webmail providers need to signcrypt their messages on behalf of them. This means that users need to securely delegate their signing capability to the Webmail providers. The combination of the proposed obfuscation for an ES functionality presented in this paper and the obfuscation for the signcryption scheme constructed in Appendix A would provide a solution. For example, even if a malicious operator inside Webmail providers is given an obfuscated signcryption program for Alice-to-Bob, he/she can neither forge Alice's signatures nor perform the signcryption operation for Alice-to-Carol. However, we must be careful. The obfuscation does not prevent the malicious operator from performing the signcryption for Alice-to-Bob. Also, if the malicious operator has access to Bob's secret decryption key, he/she can forge Alice's signatures (In the case of our proposed obfuscations, what is worse is that he/she can extract Alice's secret signing key from the obfuscated program). The formal security argument for the signcryption and obfuscation outlined in Appendix A is outside the scope of this proceedings version.
Basic Idea
Our obfuscation is based on the following basic idea: We construct a special pair of signature and encryption schemes such that generating a signature on a message and then encrypting the signature is functionally equivalent to encrypting the signing key and then generating a signature on the message under the encrypted signing key. The former process is the ES functionality. In the latter process, "encrypting the signing key" can be viewed as an obfuscation of the ES functionality and "generating a signature on the message under the encrypted signing key" corresponds to executing the obfuscated program.
We informally describe how to construct such a special pair using the BLS signature scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [7] . Let (q, G, G T , e, g) be a parameter for a bilinear map, where both G and G T are cyclic groups of prime order q, e is an efficient bilinear mapping from G × G to G T , and g is a generator of G. A public verification and secret signing key pair is (v, s) such that v = g s , where s is a random number in Z * q . Given a message m, the signature σ is calculated as H(m) s , where H : {0, 1} * → G is a hash function. We can verify the signature by checking the equality e(g, σ) = e(H(m), v). If the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, the scheme is secure in the random oracle model [4] , where H is modeled as a random oracle. Also, we use a secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to encrypt the signature value σ = H(m) s . Let KEM.Enc(pk) be the encryption algorithm of the secure KEM. Given a public encryption key pk, it generates a pair of a random key r and its ciphertext c. Given KEM.Enc, we define an encryption algorithm Enc, which takes as input a plaintext p(= H(m) s ) ∈ G and a public key pk, generates (r, c) ← KEM.Enc(pk), and outputs (c, p r ) as the ciphertext. The key and message spaces of KEM.Enc and Enc are Z * q and G, respectively. The decryption is straightforward (You can decrypt c to recover r and then p). Then we consider the ES functionality defined as the sequential composition of the BLS signing algorithm and the encryption algorithm Enc. That is, given a message m, it computes the signature H(m) s , generates (r, c) ← KEM.Enc(pk), and outputs (c, H(m) sr ). The naive program implementing the ES functionality contains (s, pk) and reveals s. Our goal is to obfuscate it. Approach 1. Given the naive program, we extract (s, pk) and encrypt s using KEM.Enc. Specifically, we generate (r, c) ← KEM.Enc(pk) and compute sr mod q, where (c, sr) is an encryption of the secret signing key s. It reveals no information on s since KEM.Enc is secure. However, using it, we can still compute an encryption of the valid signature of a given message m. That is, we can construct an obfuscated program C c,sr containing (c, sr), which takes as input m and outputs (c, H(m) sr ). Note that the output is an encryption of the valid signature H(m) s by Enc. The problem here is that C c,sr does not preserve the probabilistic ES functionality since it is deterministic. If Enc is rerandomizable with pk 2 , we can fix the problem simply by rerandomizing (c, H(m) sr ). That is, we can construct a new obfuscated program C c,sr,pk containing (c, sr, pk), which takes as input m, computes (c, H(m) sr ), rerandomizes it using pk, and outputs the rerandomized ciphertext. The contained information (c, sr, pk) reveals no information on s because it is a ciphertext. It is not difficult to see that the obfuscation satisfies a VBP under the assumption that KEM.Enc is secure. In other words, the VBP simply reduces to the security of KEM.Enc.
Approach 1 (A special case of Approach 1). We describe a sufficient condition under which Enc is rerandomizable with pk. If KEM.Enc satisfies a scalar homomorphic property (and is rerandomizable with pk), then Enc is rerandomizable with pk. By the scalar homomorphic property, we mean that, given a KEM ciphertext c, we can compute (r , c ) such that r is a new random key and c is a ciphertext of rr mod q. We denote the operation by (r , c ) ← multiply pk (c). In this approach, a modified obfuscated program C c,sr,pk computes (c, H(m) sr ), generates (r , c ) ← multiply pk (c), and outputs (c , H(m) srr ), which is a rerandomization of (c, H(m) sr ). Bob can decrypt c to recover rr and then H(m) s . We are done if C c,sr,pk preserves the probabilistic functionality. However, we still have a potential problem. The distribution of c may be different from the original distribution produced by KEM.Enc. If KEM.Enc is rerandomizable with pk, we can fix it simply by rerandomizing c . That is, a modified program C c,sr,pk computes (c , H(m) srr ), rerandomizes c as c , and outputs (c , H(m) srr ). For example, we can use the Paillier encryption scheme as KEM.Enc [31] . However, since its message (key) space is Z n such that n is the product of two large primes, we need to define the bilinear group for the BLS scheme as having order n.
Approach 2. When
Enc cannot be rerandomizable and we can not take Approaches 1 and 1 , we can consider a new ES functionality. The new ES functionality is the sequential composition of the BLS signing algorithm and a new encryption algorithm Enc . Enc takes as input a plaintext p(= H(m) s ) ∈ G and a public key pk, runs KEM.Enc twice ((r 1 , c 1 ) ← KEM.Enc(pk), (r 2 , c 2 ) ← KEM.Enc(pk)), and outputs (c 1 , c 2 , p r1r2 ). Clearly, the use of two random keys (r 1 , r 2 ) is redundant, but we can obfuscate the naive program as follows: Given the naive program, we extract (s, pk), generate (r 1 , c 1 ) ← KEM.Enc(pk), and compute sr 1 mod q. Then, we construct an obfuscated program C c1,sr1,pk containing (c 1 , sr 1 , pk), which takes as input m, generates (r 2 , c 2 ) ← KEM.Enc(pk), and outputs (c 1 , c 2 , H(m) sr1r2 ). The contained information (c 1 , sr 1 , pk) is the same as in the previous approaches and reveals no information on s. Note that the C c1,sr1,pk does not preserve the probabilistic ES functionality since the value of c 1 is always the same. However, if KEM.Enc is rerandomizable with pk, then it is easy to fix the problem by rerandomizing c 1 . In this approach, we can use any rerandomizable encryption scheme as KEM.Enc.
Comparison. Let us briefly compare the above three approaches. Approaches 1 and 2 require that Enc and KEM.Enc are rerandomizable, respectively. Approach 1 is a special case of Approach 1 and requires that a scalar homomorphic property (and rerandomizability) of KEM.Enc, which is a strong requirement. Note that we may be able to take Approach 1 without using the scalar homomorphic property required by Approach 1 (although we don't have a concrete example). Approach 2 requires a redundancy of ciphertexts. Therefore, Approach 1 seems to be the best approach.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we will use the pair of Waters's signature scheme [33] and the linear encryption scheme proposed by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [5] to take Approach 1 and propose a secure obfuscator for the ES functionality. Following the security definition and argument by Hohenberger et al. in [24] , we present a security analysis of our proposed obfuscation. Waters's signature scheme is more complicated than the BLS scheme, but it is provably secure in the standard model. All security arguments in this paper are in the standard model.
Our contributions are summarized as follows: In Section 3, we propose two security definitions of digital signature schemes in the context of ES. One requires that no adversary can existentially forge a signature even if it is given black-box access to the ES functionality. The other requires the same even if it is given an obfuscated program for the ES functionality. We expect that the former/weaker definition implies the latter/stronger definition if the obfuscator satisfies a VBP. In Section 4, we propose a natural generalization of the VBP definition proposed by Hohenberger et al. in [24] so that we can show that the weaker existential unforgeability implies the stronger one. As stated in [24] , their proposed VBP provides a meaningful security for cryptographic schemes if they satisfy a special property called distinguishable attack property. Unfortunately, digital signature schemes do not have this property in the context of ES. This is the reason why we need to introduce the generalized VBP definition. In Section 5, we propose a special ES functionality, which is the sequential composition of Waters's signature scheme and the linear encryption scheme, and construct an obfuscator for it. We prove that the obfuscator is secure under the generalized VBP definition and that Waters's signature scheme satisfies the stronger existential unforgeability with the obfuscator.
Related Works
Some related works are already mentioned in the previous sections. In particular, our work is inspired by the secure obfuscation for re-encryption in [24] . Both reencryption and ES functionalities output a ciphertext and this common property enables us to simulate real obfuscated programs by randomly generating junk programs to prove the VBPs.
Our proposed obfuscation can be viewed as public-key obfuscation for signing functionalities [30, 1] . A generic construction of public key obfuscations with a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is discussed in [18] .
There are some different definitional approaches than VBPs to capture the unintelligibility of obfuscation, e.g., indistinguishability of obfuscation [3] , bestpossible obfuscation [21] , and non-malleable obfuscation [12] .
Preliminaries
Given a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1, 2, · · · , n}. We say that a function ν(·) : IN → IR + is negligible in n if for every polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large n's, it holds that ν(n) < 1/p(n). Given a probability distribution S, we denote by x ← S the operation of selecting an element according to S. If A is a probabilistic machine then A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) denotes the output distribution of A on inputs (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ). Let Pr[x ← S 1 ; x 2 ← S 2 ; . . . ; x k ← S k : E] denote the probability of the event E after the processes x 1 ← S 1 , x 2 ← S 2 , . . . , x k ← S k are performed in order. PPT stands for "probabilistic polynomial time". All PPT machines in this paper run in probabilistic polynomial-time in the security parameter denoted by n. Also, some PPT machines (e.g., representing adversaries) are allowed to take non-uniform auxiliary input of polynomial length in n, which is denoted by z.
Circuit Obfuscators
A class of circuits is of the form C = {C n } n∈IN , where C n is a set of polynomialsize circuits with input length l in (n) and output length l out (n), where l in (n) and l out (n) are polynomials. It has an associated PPT generation algorithm which takes as input 1 n and generates a random circuit C from C n . In this paper, it corresponds to the random selection of information such as cryptographic keys on security parameter 1 n . We denote the generation process by C ← C n . When a circuit is used as an input or an output argument of an algorithm, we assume that an encoding of circuits is used implicitly (e.g., obfuscators take as input a circuit and output a circuit). The results of this paper are independent of any particular encoding method.
Let C(x, r) be a probabilistic circuit which takes the regular input x and the random input r. Given a regular input x, we can view C(x, ·) as a sampling algorithm for the distribution obtained by evaluating C(x, r) on random coins r. Given two probabilistic circuits (C 1 , C 2 ) whose regular inputs are of the same length, we denote by (C 1 (x), C 2 (x)) the two distributions produced by C 1 (x, ·) and C 2 (x, ·) and by StaDiff(C 1 (x), C 2 (x)) the statistical difference between them, i.e., StaDiff(
When we say that a machine M has black-box access to a probabilistic circuit C, we have two different meanings: oracle access and sampling access. Oracle access is such that M is allowed to set both regular and random inputs. We denote it by M C . Sampling access is such that M is allowed to set only the regular input, but not the random input. That is, when M makes an oracle query x, M obtains a uniform and independent sample from the distribution produced by C(x, ·). We denote it by M
C . An obfuscator for a class of circuits C = {C n } n∈IN is a PPT machine which takes as input a circuit C ∈ C n and outputs an unintelligible circuit C which preserve the functionality. In this paper, we require that the functionality should be perfectly preserved.
Definition 1. A PPT machine
Obf is a circuit obfuscator for a class of probabilistic circuits C = {C n } n∈IN if, for every probabilistic circuit C ∈ C n , the following holds: Pr[C ← Obf(C) : ∀x, StaDiff(C(x), C (x)) = 0] = 1. Remark 1. We can relax the functionality requirement by allowing a negligible statistical difference and a negligible error probability as in [23, 24] . In this paper, we use this stronger definition because our proposed obfuscator can satisfy it. Definition 1 says nothing about the security requirement and we will formulate it based on VBPs in Section 4.
Public-Key Encryption and Digital Signatures
We review the security notions of public-key encryption (PKE) and digital signature (DS) schemes (Our definitions are based on [19] ). Let Setup be an algorithm which, on security parameter 1 n , generates a parameter to be used commonly by multiple users in a pair of PKE and DS schemes.
A PKE scheme consists of three algorithms (EKG, E, D). The key generation algorithm EKG is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a common parameter p and returns a public-secret key pair (pk, sk). The encryption algorithm E is a probabilistic algorithm which takes a common parameter p, a public key pk, and a plaintext m ∈ M S(p, pk) to return a ciphertext c, where M S(p, pk) is the message space defined by (p, pk). The encryption process is denoted by c ← E(p, pk, m). The decryption algorithm D is a deterministic algorithm which takes a common parameter p, a secret key sk, and a ciphertext c to return the plaintext m, and the decryption process is denoted by m = D(p, sk, c). When the given ciphertext is invalid, the decryption algorithm produces a special symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext was invalid. It is required that, for every key information (p, pk, sk) and every message m ∈ M S(p, pk), the decryption always succeeds, i.e., Pr[c ← E(p, pk, m) : D(p, sk, c) = m] = 1. The following is the standard indistinguishability requirement against chosen plaintext attacks (CPAs). The definition is for a single message, but implies the indistinguishability requirement for polynomially multiple messages [19] .
Definition 2 (Indistinguishability of Encryptions against CPAs). A PKE scheme (EKG, E, D) satisfies the indistinguishability if the following condition holds:
For every PPT machine pair (A 1 , A 2 ) (adversary), every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
where we assume that A 1 produces a valid message pair m 1 and m 2 ∈ M S(p, pk).
A DS scheme consists of three algorithms (SKG, S, V). The key generation algorithm SKG is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a common parameter p and returns a public-secret key pair (pk, sk). The signing algorithm S is a probabilistic algorithm which takes a common parameter p, a secret key sk, and a plaintext m ∈ M S(p, pk) to return a signature σ, where M S(p, pk) is the message space defined by (p, pk). The signing process is denoted by σ ← S(p, sk, m). The verification algorithm V is a deterministic algorithm which takes a common parameter p, a public key pk, a message m, and a signature σ to return Accept if σ is a valid signature of m, and the verification process is denoted by d = V(p, pk, m, σ). It is required that, for every key information (p, pk, sk) and every message m ∈ M S(p, pk), the verification of valid signatures always succeeds, i.e., Pr[σ ← S(p, sk, m) : V(p, pk, m, σ) = Accept] = 1. The following is the standard existential unforgeability (EU) requirement against chosen-message attacks (CMAs).
Definition 3 (Existential Unforgeability against CMAs). A DS scheme (SKG, S, V) is existentially unforgeable if the following condition holds: For every
PPT oracle machine A (adversary), every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
where S p,sk is the signing oracle (circuit) and Q is the set of messages queried by A adaptively.
Security of Digital Signatures in the Context of ES
In this section, we re-define the EU requirement on DS schemes in the context of ES. Let (EKG, E, D) and (SKG, S, V) be a pair of PKE and DS schemes. We consider the ES functionality F ES = {F n } n∈IN for the two schemes. Given a common parameter p, a secret signing key sk, and a public encryption key pk e generated with the security parameter 1 n , the ES functionality F p,sk,pke ∈ F n is defined as follows:
1. When F p,sk,pke is run on a message m, it generates a signature on m under sk (σ ← S(p, sk, m)), encrypts σ under pk e (c ← E(p, pk e , σ)), and outputs c. 2. When F p,sk,pke is run on the special input keys, it outputs (p, pk, pk e ), where pk is the public verification key corresponding to sk.
Also, we define a corresponding class of circuits C ES = {C n } n∈IN which implements F ES . C n is a set of circuits C p,sk,pke implementing F p,sk,pke . The associated generation algorithm takes as input 1 n , generates p ← Setup(1 n ), (sk, pk) ← SKG(p) and (sk e , pk e ) ← EKG(p), and outputs C p,sk,pke .
The following is the EU requirement re-defined in the context of ES. The difference from Definition 3 is that A is given the public encryption key pk e . However, it is still equivalent to Definition 3.
Definition 4 (EU w.r.t. ES Functionality). Let (EKG, E, D) and (SKG, S, V)
be a pair of PKE and DS schemes. The DS scheme is existentially unforgeable w.r.t. the ES functionality if the following condition holds: For every PPT machine A (adversary), every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
Note that the adversary A implicitly has sampling access to F p,sk,pke because it has sampling access to the signing oracle S p,sk and takes as input the public encryption key (p, pk e ). In this sense, Definition 4 requires that the signature scheme is still existentially unforgeable even when A is given sampling access to F p,sk,pke .
Next, we consider a stronger EU, which requires that the signature scheme is still existentially unforgeable even when A is given an obfuscated circuit for F p,sk,pke . The following is the strengthened definition and the difference from Definition 4 is that A is given an obfuscated circuit for F p,sk,pke .
Definition 5 (EU w.r.t. ES Obfuscator). Let (EKG, E, D) and (SKG, S, V) be a pair of PKE and DS schemes. Also, let Obf be a circuit obfuscator for C ES . The DS scheme is existentially unforgeable w.r.t. Obf if the following condition holds: For every PPT machine A (adversary), every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
We expect that if Obf satisfies a strong VBP, then the EU w.r.t. the ES functionality implies the (stronger) EU w.r.t. Obf. The question is what VBP Obf should satisfy for the implication to hold. We will answer it in the next section.
Remark 2. We can re-define the indistinguishability of encryptions in the context of ES in a similar way. However, we omit it because the main purpose of obfuscators is to hide Alice's secret signing key but not Bob's secret decryption key. Note that the indistinguishability is preserved even when the distinguisher D in Definition 2 is given the naive program for ES that reveals the signing key.
Virtual Black-Box Properties
In this section, we review average-case VBP (ACVBP) proposed by Hohenberger et al. in [24] , under which the VBP of the re-encryption obfuscator is proved. As stated in [24] , their ACVBP provides a meaningful security for cryptographic schemes if they satisfy a special property called distinguishable attack property. Unfortunately, DS schemes do not have this property in the context of ES. That is, even if Obf satisfies the ACVBP under their ACVBP definition, the EU w.r.t. the ES functionality does not necessarily imply the stronger EU w.r.t. Obf. Therefore, we propose a natural generalization of their ACVBP definition under which we can claim that, if Obf satisfies the (stronger) ACVBP, then the implication holds.
First of all, we review the definition of ACVBP proposed in [24] .
Definition 6 (ACVBP [24] ). A circuit obfuscator Obf for C satisfies the ACVBP if the following condition holds: There exists a PPT oracle machine S (simulator) such that, for every PPT oracle machine D (distinguisher), every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
It was proposed as a general definition in the sense that it is not specific to re-encryption. The authors gave an informal discussion that their proposed ACVBP provides a meaningful security in cryptographic settings [24, Section 2.1]. We briefly review it below. In general, VBPs should guarantee that if a cryptographic scheme is secure when the adversary is given black-box access to a program, then it remains secure when the adversary is given the obfuscated program. The authors claim that for a large class of applications (including reencryption), obfuscators satisfying Definition 6 indeed give this guarantee. More specifically, the authors propose to use the following informal argument: If a cryptographic scheme has the following three properties:
1. The scheme is secure against black-box adversaries with sampling access to functionality X selected randomly from a family F ; 2. A distinguisher D with sampling access to X can test whether an adversary A can break the security guarantee of the scheme (distinguishable attack property); 3. There exists a circuit obfuscator satisfying ACVBP for a class C F of circuits implementing F ;
Then the cryptographic scheme is also secure against adversaries who are given an obfuscation of a circuit selected at random from the class C F . The argument works for re-encryption functionalities as discussed in [24] , where F is a re-encryption functionality and the cryptographic scheme is the underlying encryption scheme. However, it does NOT work for ES functionalities, where the cryptographic scheme is a pair of PKE and DS schemes, F is the ES functionality F ES , and X is F p,sk,pke . Let us check whether the argument goes through for the DS scheme. We have no problem with the first and third conditions. The first condition requires that the DS scheme satisfies the standard EU requirement according to Definition 4. The third condition requires that there exists a circuit obfuscator satisfying ACVBP for C ES . The problem is that the second condition is not satisfied in this case. The reason is that A has sampling access to the signing oracle, but D does not have.
Remark 3. Readers might ask if Definition 6 still provides a meaningful security for cryptographic schemes even when they do NOT satisfy the distinguishable attack property. However, it is not the case. We can show that there exists a cryptographic functionality using a secret information such that (1) the secret operation does not satisfy the distinguishable attack property and (2) it has an obfuscator satisfying the ACVBP under Definition 6, but any obfuscated circuit reveals the secret information.
As discussed above, Definition 6 is not strong enough for our purpose. In order to make it stronger, we propose a natural generalization. The generalization allows distinguishers to have sampling access not only to C but also to a set of oracles dependent on C.
Definition 7 (ACVBP w.r.t. Dependent Oracles). Let T (C) be a set of oracles dependent on the circuit C. A circuit obfuscator Obf for C satisfies the ACVBP w.r.t. dependent oracle set T if the following condition holds: There exists a PPT oracle machine S (simulator) such that, for every PPT oracle machine D (distinguisher), every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
,
means that D has sampling access to all oracles contained in T (C) in addition to C.
Clearly, for every T , this generalized ACVBP implies the ACVBP in Definition 6.
Remark 4. Since T (C) can be viewed as dependent auxiliary-input to adversaries, it is natural to allow the simulator S to have access to T (C). However, we did not allow it because the security proof of our obfuscator does not need it.
Now we can clarify the condition on Obf under which the EU w.r.t. the ES functionality implies the EU w.r.t. Obf. Theorem 1. Let T (C p,sk,pke ) be {S p,sk }. If an obfuscator Obf for C ES satisfies ACVBP w.r.t. dependent oracle set T , then the EU w.r.t the ES functionality implies the EU w.r.t. Obf.
Proof. We show that, if the EU w.r.t. the ES functionality is satisfied, but the stronger EU w.r.t. Obf is NOT satisfied, then it contradicts the ACVBP w.r.t. dependent oracle set T . Let A be the adversary that breaks the stronger EU. Consider the following distinguisher D that uses sampling access to T (C p,sk,pke ) to check whether the adversary A succeeds in breaking the stronger EU.
1. Take as input a circuit C and an auxiliary-input z. (C is either an obfuscated circuit or a simulated circuit). 2. Use the sampling access to C p,sk,pke to get (p, pk, pk e ). 3. Use the sampling access to S p,sk to simulate (m, σ, Q) ← A S p,sk (p, pk, pk e , C, z). If C is an obfuscated circuit, then the probability D outputs 1 is equal to the probability that A breaks the stronger EU, which is not negligible by the assumption. On the other hand, if C is a simulated circuit, then the probability D outputs 1 is negligible, otherwise, A can be used to break the standard EU w.r.t. the ES functionality. Therefore, it contradicts the ACVBP w.r.t. dependent oracle set T .
Remark 5. Note that the proof argument does not work under the ACVBP definition (Definition 6), where distinguishers are not allowed to use dependent oracle set T .
In this section, we propose an obfuscator for a special ES functionality and prove the security based on the generalized ACVBP definition. Our proposed ES functionality is the sequential composition of Waters's signature scheme and the linear encryption scheme.
Algebraic Setting and Complexity Assumptions
First of all, we review the required algebraic setting and complexity assumptions. Let Setup be an algorithm which, on input the security parameter 1 n , randomly generates the parameters for a bilinear map (q, G, G T , e, g), where q is a prime of length n, both G and G T are groups of order q, e is an efficient bilinear mapping from G × G to G T , g is a generator of G (e.g., refer to [6, Section 5] ). The mapping e satisfies the following two properties: (i) Bilinear: for all g ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z q , e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab .
(ii) Non-degenerate: if g generates G, then e(g a , g b ) = 1. In this paper, we use the following two Diffie-Hellman assumptions. All assumptions are standard ones which have been used in the literature. The first one is so-called the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption (e.g., see [25, 33] ), which assumes that, given g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) d , it is hard to check whether abc = d. The second one is the Decisional Linear (DL) assumption (e.g., see [5, 24] ), which assumes that, given g, g a , g b , g t , (g a ) r , (g b ) s , it is hard to check whether r + s = t. Definition 9 (DL Assumption). For every PPT machine D, every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n ∈ IN, and every z ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ,
.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have constructed an obfuscator for a special ES functionality and presented a security analysis. We can generalize our construction to clarify the properties that a pair of PKE and DS schemes should satisfy so that the ES functionality can be securely obfuscated. We omit it due to the space limitation. Here, we list several DS schemes satisfying all the required properties: Lysyanskaya's unique signature scheme [28] , Dodis's verifiable random function (signature scheme) [15] , the undeniable signature scheme by Chaum and Antwerpen [13] , the DDH-based pseudo-random function (MAC) proposed by Naor and Reingold [29] , and Schnorr's signature scheme [32] . We have proposed generic approaches to obfuscating ES functionalities (Approaches 1,1 , and 2). We took Approach 1 using the scalar homomorphic property of the linear encryption scheme. If we take Approaches 1 and 2 where the only requirement on Enc and KEM.Enc is rerandomizability, then we can use an encryption scheme with a relaxed version of chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security [10] . It is an interesting research issue to investigate what kind of CCA security we can achieve in the context of ES obfuscation.
Finally, we believe that our proposed obfuscation can be used to securely obfuscate a signcryption scheme as described in Appendix A. The formal security argument is a future work item.
